PKI

Work in Progress

Summary

Attacks on PKI

  • implementation bugs: null-byte parsing vulnerability in OpenSSL certificate names
  • CA compromise: rogue CA issuing false certificates
  • social engineering: typosquatting, homograph, and subdomain spoofing to mimic trusted sites
  • too many root CAs: weakens global trust — any one compromised CA can issue fake certificates

Revocation

  • certificates can be revoked before expiry (e.g. key compromised, entity closed, CA hacked)
  • mechanisms:
    • CRL (Certificate Revocation List): signed list of revoked certs
    • OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol): real-time query to verify if a certificate is still valid

Concept

Public Key Infrastructure(PKI)

  • since PKC requires a secure broadcast channel to distribute public keys
  • ensure that public keys are authentic

Certificate Authority(CA)

  • trusted third party that issues and signs certificates
  • maintains a verified directory of identity -> public key mappings

Certificates

  • digital document that binds an entity to a public key
  • digitally signed by a CA
  • implies that the public key belongs to the entity during the validity period
  • fields:
    • entity’s name (e.g. www.nus.edu.sg)
    • entity’s public key
    • validity period
    • signature by CA, hashed by CA private key (authenticity)
    • usage info (encryption, signing, CA authority, etc.)
  • standard: ITU-T X.509

Self-signed certificates

  • signed by its owner
  • needs user to manually accept

CA chain

  • root CAs are pre-installed in browsers/OS, used to sign other CAs
    • root CA(self signed) -> intermmediate CA -> end-entity CA